

Strengthening Transnational Advocacy Network Theory: Lessons from Ecuador

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The transnational campaign against the construction and design of Ecuador's second oil-transporting pipeline, the *Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado*, had no impact on that state's endorsement of the pipeline project and only a negligible effect on related social and environmental policies. This outcome is at odds with theoretical formulations, such as the one advanced by Keck and Sikkink (1997), that hold that certain forms of transnational advocacy campaigns can act as effective agents of state-level policy changes. In fact, the Ecuadorian anti-pipeline campaign can be considered a "most likely case" of effective campaigning under Keck and Sikkink's approach. Consequently, the implications of campaign failure are theoretically and practically important. Analysis of the significance of the *Oleoducto* campaign, however, should not disintegrate into endless tinkering with the original formulation so as to facilitate a reconciliation of theory and empirical fact. Instead, the *Oleoducto* case signals the need for a single correction to the original formulation: a shift in analytic focus to one that acknowledges not only campaign-level, but also international-level, dynamics and encourages the integration of theoretical approaches that have hitherto focused on one level to the near exclusion of the other.

Transnational advocacy theories tend to focus principally on the activist campaign itself or on its immediate (i.e., domestic) context. Popular research topics include the constructive dynamics of movements and networks, the challenges presented by grassroots campaigning to democratic consolidation within a given state, and the emergence and sustainability of activist campaigns (see, e.g., Loveman, 1998; Yashar, 2005; McAdam, et al., 2001). While many models of transnational advocacy expect that actors from the international community will intervene in disputes between state and sub-state actors, few writers treat seriously this "third actor." In fact, it often seems that the transnational advocacy literature has simply transplanted social movement theories to the international level without accounting for the additional dimension and its attendant interaction dynamics. Efforts to graft social movement theories onto the international level have allowed for a rather static understanding of the potential impact of international-level actors on campaign outcome. Neglect of the pivotal international dimension can significantly undermined the predictive power of transnational advocacy theories.

Neglect of the pivotal international dimension has significantly undermined the predictive power of transnational advocacy theories. In fact, a transnational campaign that aims to induce a norm shift on the

national level is unlikely to succeed if the desired outcome challenges dominant international values and the political structures that support them. In the end, specific, international-level constellations of costs and benefits associated with the choice of a campaign target (to respond to or ignore campaign demands) would seem to have as much to do with the outcome as campaign execution, the quality of the network, or the nature of the campaign issue. With this in mind, it is reasonable to ponder the significance of the global political economy – and not just its component parts – for transnational activism in general; certainly, this one factor is necessarily common to all transnational campaigns and, as such, provides a jumping-off point for future research into the utility of this approach.

This article will build on existing transnational advocacy literature by further incorporating international-level actors and by arguing that transnational advocacy practice and theory must confront the complexities of the international political economy. The first step towards this goal is to briefly review the principal findings of this theoretical approach. Where possible, excerpts from a previously conducted case study of a failed campaign to halt the construction of a second oil-transporting pipeline in Ecuador will be used to anchor and illustrate theoretical arguments.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DOMINANT THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

The term “**Transnational Action Network**” or TAN, was adopted by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1997) in their book *Activists Beyond Borders*. In this well-received work, the authors used the term to refer to any network, or loose and fluid configuration, of activists who – whether tied primarily to national or international political arenas – collaborate in order to convince national governments to comply with activists’ demands, and by extension with international norms and democratic principles. Keck and Sikkink’s formulation is sufficiently representative of the literature as a whole to serve as a basis for a short review of principal theoretical concepts.

The authors’ (Keck & Sikkink, 1997) survey of the interactions of network actors revealed a number of meaningful patterns, the most successful and common of which they dubbed the “boomerang.” In this particular pattern, domestic activists, unable to access or influence their national government, seek out an international ally who is able and willing to transmit their message to the international community. Actors from this broader community then attempt to use their various forms of leverage in order to petition the national government to address the grievances of the domestic activists. Historically, boomerang patterns of activism have had varying success; as Sydney Tarrow (2005, p. 200) notes, “Transnational intervention fails more often than it succeeds.” Keck and Sikkink (1997) reason that campaign outcome is determined by four independent variables.

The first of these variables concerns the characteristics of *the state being targeted by the campaign*. The authors expect success to be most likely when the targeted state is responsive to pressure. Various conditions might heighten vulnerability: (1) if a state is party to international agreements; (2) is seeking to maintain or increase its access to the international market; (3) is seeking recognition as a democratic state; (4) or generally stands to gain or lose economic opportunities as a consequence of its international reputation. Keck and Sikkink (1997, p. 29) state that “[v]ulnerability arises both from the availability of leverage and the target’s sensitivity to leverage; if either is missing, a campaign may fail.”

The second independent variable concerns *the specific manner in which a campaign is cast*; of particular importance is the matter of issue framing and resonance. A frame, or conceptual presentation, is most likely to succeed when it presents the problem in terms of right or wrong and assigns blame for its occurrence. The third independent variable concerns *the public’s perception of the activists themselves*. In order to be effective, the activists must be seen as truthful reporters. The public must believe that activists are

legitimate representatives of the victims and activists’ relationships must be transparent and unproblematic (Keck & Sikkink, 1997).

The final causal variable concerns *the quality of the network itself*. Keck and Sikkink (1997) emphasize that the size and the density of a network are directly related to its ability to conduct a successful campaign or bring pressure to bear on the targeted state. Size of a network simply refers to the number of members it claims. Density, a more complex concept, is the measure of the number, quality and strength of the ties that exist between network members. Such ties allow for smooth transfer of resources, coordination of action, information dissemination, and access to powerful potential allies.

That three of the four independent variables focus on the network and its campaign clearly indicates that Keck and Sikkink (1997) find that the outcome is primarily dependent on campaign-level factors. The fourth independent variable concerns the target’s vulnerability to international-level actors that are allied with the TAN. The authors do not consider that international actors might work to oppose TAN goals or to protect the target from TAN pressures. The reason for their intense focus on campaign-level factors can be found in the conclusion of their work wherein the authors discuss the ways in which their theory is distinct from liberalism.

The authors acknowledge that both theoretical perspectives allow that individuals can act as the “motor of change” and enjoy a notable degree of influence on the national and international levels (Keck & Sikkink, 1997). According to Keck and Sikkink, liberalism holds that individuals structure the preferences of (democratic) states and, by extension, have impacts on inter-state interaction. These individuals’ behaviors, however, are informed by risk-averse self-interest, and not principles or values, and so cannot explain how individuals might influence other self-interested individual-level actors to adopt a position similar to their own. In essence, Liberalism holds that change occurs via a one-way vertical structure of influence and communication that links sub-state to state levels and state to international levels.

In contrast, theories of transnational network advocacy envision that horizontal contact is established between actors regardless of their position within a vertical political and societal ordering. Contact and interaction frequently occur as a result of already-existing complementary values. Where similar values do not yet exist, however, a network can facilitate communication between actors; these exchanges have a constructivist effect on participants that speeds the development of shared values.

Essentially, the authors imagine that self-interest is necessarily tied to a specific context while certain values are potentially universal, located in the individual rather than in a particular political or social context. Communicating these values to others can trigger mobilization around shared principles and, where a state resists actors' attempts to influence its preferences from within, then coordination between the network and a power-wielding ally on the international level can structure state preference from without (Keck & Sikkink, 1997).

It follows from this theoretical foundation that the character of the network is of utmost importance since only a network can facilitate constructivist exchanges and only under certain conditions. Of secondary importance is the character of the state; democracy allows for influence from within while the absence of democracy can lead to efforts to influence state preferences from without. Lagging far behind are network allies originating in the level of the international system. Their origins, characters, and preferences remain a mystery; the authors do not consider whether networks can create an ally where there is none, or bolster it where it is insufficiently powerful vis-à-vis the target. To a great degree, the authors leave to chance the ability of a network to secure international-level leverage that is both powerful and relevant enough to restructure target preferences and thereby consolidate change (Keck & Sikkink, 1997).

TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM IN ECUADOR: AN OVERVIEW

The Ecuadorian network initially formed in reaction to the disastrous impacts of Ecuador's first pipeline, the *Sistema de Oleoducto Trans-Ecuatoriano* [Trans-ecuadorian Pipeline System, or SOTE], constructed in 1969. Unfarallon ("Latin American Export Bank, SA: Oil and Equator," undated) notes that in its first two decades of operation, the SOTE sustained "more than 60 major ruptures resulting in 614,000 barrels of spilled oil - more than twice the 260,000 barrels that were spilled by the Exxon Valdez." Knudson (2003, p. 2) finds that "[b]y contrast, the 800-mile trans-Alaskan pipeline, which came on line in 1977 and carries more than twice as much oil, has spilled just 85,000 barrels."

The founding members of the network collected and distributed information concerning the impact of oil activity in the Amazonian region of Ecuador. Judith Kimerling's (1991) study of the environmental and social impacts of oil activities in the Ecuadorian Amazon was the first critical study and assessment ever made available to the public; it appeared in English in 1991 and then in Spanish in 1993. This pioneering work alerted the international community to the extent of the

contamination, ensuring the issue a place on the international activist agenda.

A second wave of environmental impact assessment was generated in the course of on-going, class-action civil suits against Texaco and other petroleum companies. *Aguinda v. Texaco* was filed on behalf of indigenous Amazonian inhabitants in the New York court system in 1993. The fact-finding missions mandated by this and by subsequent cases reduced scientific uncertainty about the environmental effects of industry procedures. They also affirmed the links between environmental degradation and pollution and the destruction of the habitats, cultures, livelihoods and physical wellbeing of the Amazonian indigenous population. This connection was further confirmed by epidemiologist Miguel San Sebastian whose research pointed to a link between environmental and social damages. San Sebastian's (1999) findings indicate that the costs of oil industry activity are not evenly distributed, but rather are borne primarily by the inhabitants of the Amazonian region.

The network used this information to protest construction of the *Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado* [Heavy Crude Pipeline, or OCP], the country's second oil-transporting pipeline. The OCP debate began in 1989 and continued for one decade. A multiplicity of actors voiced their positions within a formally democratic national context, as each sought to influence the policy environment that prevailed during the conception and construction of the OCP. In fact, according to Keck and Sikkink's (1997) formulation, the OCP campaign possessed every aspect and enjoyed every advantage necessary for achieving a successful outcome. In this case, success would take the form of a moratorium on the OCP project or, at the least, a sincere effort on the part of the state to ensure that the policies governing the design, construction and operation of the pipeline would be consistent with international standards.

The TAN did win a few battles in its war with the Ecuadorian state. One of these, a skirmish over the routing of the OCP, followed quite perfectly Keck and Sikkink's (1997) description of boomerang patterns of influence. Activists alerted World Bank officials to the OCP consortium's claim that its pipeline project was in compliance with World Bank standards. High-ranking Bank officials immediately demanded the retraction of this assertion. Their communication was followed by an influential 2002 report on the Environmental and Social Impact Evaluations of the OCP project (Goodland, 2002). In this assessment, Robert Goodland, chief of the Environment Department of the World Bank for 25 years until his retirement in 2001, accused the OCP consortium of substantial non-compliance with World Bank environmental and social criteria.

While the state was not moved to reconsider the chosen route, Goodland's condemnation of the pipeline

project did cause Germany's largest publicly-owned bank, Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB), to withdraw as the lead arranger of the original 17-year OCP syndicated bank loan of \$900 million (Van Gelder, 2003). In Parliamentary hearings on the subject, Germany's influential Green Party echoed TAN activists who insisted that the WestLB honor its lending policy requirements for project compliance with World Bank environmental guidelines (AmazonWatch, 2003). Although the pipeline was by then largely completed, the WestLB withdrew completely.

Despite such gains, the TAN did not influence the state's normative or policy positions in regards to the OCP. Rather, the Ecuadorian state continued to circumvent the requirements of its own national laws, undermine the capacity of domestic institutional mechanisms for regulation and enforcement, abrogate its obligations under international agreements, and ignore the recommendations of international experts and activists. In fact, even as the TAN increased its pressure, the Ecuadorian state quickened the pace of the project and openly used force to repress network opposition. For example, its military signed contracts with private oil companies ensuring protection of personnel, equipment and production activities in exchange for meals and medical care. Since oil-related activity occurs on indigenous territories, the military-industry collaboration violated Article 28 of the *United Nations Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Groups* (1994), which states that "Military activities shall not take place in the lands and territories of indigenous peoples, unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned."

Amnesty International (2005) reported numerous instances in which indigenous peoples suffered bodily harm, kidnappings, torture, and death at the hands of the national police and military. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights reprimanded the government for its role in these developments and charged it to take corrective action immediately; the Minister of Mines and Energy replied that "la OEA no manda aquí" [or, "the OAS does not give the orders here"] and signaled that the government's oil contracts would remain unchanged (Amnesty International, 2004). Clearly the state cannot be said to have shown any appreciable degree of vulnerability to international pressures resulting from its international commitments and interests.

In the end, despite the characteristics of the TAN and the target, the OCP campaign failed in its goal of preventing the construction and operation of the OCP. The TAN, however, continued to operate even as crude began to flow through the OCP in 2003. Not surprisingly, its goals and makeup have morphed in the process so that the predominant focus of the present-day TAN is to retard the development of newer

concessions. One of these, the Ishpingo-Tapococha-Tiputini (ITT) block, is located within the Yasuní National Park, a nationally-protected UNESCO Biosphere that has been called the earth's most biodiverse forest (Finer, 2004).

In 2005, a newly-formed activist organization called Scientists Concerned for Yasuní (SCY) learned from satellite imagery that *Petróleo Brasileiro S.A* (Petrobras) had commenced construction on an illegal access road in the buffer zone of primary forest of the Yasuní National Park. The SCY's letter-writing campaign to protect the roadless integrity of Yasuní achieved positive results under then-President Alfredo Palacio and his appointee, Environment Minister Anita Alban. The latter cited information provided by SCY in a 2005 letter to Petrobras stating that the company did not have governmental authorization to construct the road (Environment News Service, 2006). In response, Petrobras sued the state for access; the lawsuit was rejected by the courts and Petrobras agreed in 2006 to adopt SCY's recommendation to access its concession within Yasuní by helicopter.

The 2006 election of Rafael Correa to the Ecuadorian presidency may have restructured the national context in favor of the TAN's Yasuní campaign. In April 2007, President Correa announced a one-year moratorium on the development of key Yasuní concessions. The stated purpose of the hiatus is allow time to formulate and implement an agreement between Ecuador and the international community under which the former will forego exploitation of Yasuní in exchange for compensation for lost revenues. Ecologist Matt Finer, an early representative for SCY and current member of the D.C.-based conservation organization Save America's Forests, characterized the reprieve as "an unprecedented opportunity to work with a progressive administration" and noted that the crucial next step will be to secure "viable proposals from the international community to present to President Correa" (Environment News Service, 2007).

How will the international community respond to Ecuador's proposal? What are the chances that the state can initiate a new relationship with the international community? How might historical precedent bear on the outcome? Both Finer's perspective and the experiences of the Ecuadorian TAN emphasize the analytical importance of the international dimension.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

For the majority of its long history, the Ecuadorian TAN targeted a state that proved equally hostile to sub-state and international-level actors. This fact challenges theories of transnational activism to better predict and account for variation in campaign outcomes. Is there a better way to judge the degree to which a state is likely

to be sensitive to international pressure than to simply tally its international normative commitments and trade treaties? What should be made of the fact that the majority of states targeted by TANs at any given moment do, in fact, maintain an array of economic and diplomatic relations with other international actors? Clearly, some differentiation between types of commitments coupled with a contextual understanding of a targeted state's international position is required.

The Goodland (2002) report scenario provides an ideal entry point into a discussion of the analytical importance of the international sphere. Recall that a perfect boomerang pattern followed the release of the report, but to no avail. As this outcome illustrates, the international political economy allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple and contradictory norms. The structural complexity of the international system was the key factor that enabled the Consortium and its financial backers to absorb the financial impact of WestLB's departure while remaining beyond the influence of the TAN's demands. To underscore this point, it is worth examining how project financiers were able to operate freely, safely removed from the arena of contention, even as their project was heavily criticized.

The OCP was funded through a combination of corporate equity and debt financing. The OCP Ltd. contributed US 400 million, or 31 percent of the cost; this parent company included corporate shareholders from seven different countries and was registered in the Cayman Islands (Van Gelder, 2003). The remainder of the project cost, US 900 million, was secured through loans from "a group of 16 financial institutions from eight countries" including nine banks and seven pension funds and insurance companies (Van Gelder, 2003, pp. 6-8).

The financial web, and consequently the network's task, was further complicated by the state's relationships with international financial institutions that predicated future lending on the state's willingness to adopt certain economic and environmental policies in support of oil industry activity in Ecuador. Beginning in year 2000, a series of IMF structural adjustment programs required that 70 percent of all OCP revenues deposited in the state's oil stabilization fund be committed to servicing the country's external debt and an additional 10 to 20 percent be put into an "interest bearing deposit account held overseas which will be drawn upon only in the event that oil prices fall below a benchmark price" (Babelon & Dahan, 2003). The 2000 *Ley de Transformación Económica del Ecuador* [Economic Transformation Law, or *Ley Trole I*] also established legal provisions for the construction of the OCP. Pablo Velasco (1996/2007, p. 1) notes that, following the President's announcement of the passage of *Ley Trole I*, Ecuador "received immediate support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World

Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, which committed more than US\$2.0 billion in credits during the next three years, subject to the completion and implementation" of the legislation. As Fischer (2000) emphasizes, failure to comply with IMF requirements would have, at a time when its external debt exceeded \$16 billion, compromised Ecuador's ability to receive a pending IMF loan as well as future loans from a variety of international sources. It would seem then that the interests of the state have been shaped by those of its creditors.

Despite their influence, creditors and other international actors are largely absent from the most direct confrontations involving TAN actors (and from the literature that investigates these contentious actions) while states are often placed in the center of such conflict. This is not a particularly effective approach for two reasons. First, the state suffers a vicious cycle of fragmentation, collapse and reconstitution. For example, Latin Finance (2002, p.1) noted that "During the 30 months it took to design the financial structure for the *Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados* (OCP) pipeline and find backers for the project, Ecuador went through three presidents and nearly half a dozen finance ministers, defaulted on its Brady bonds and Eurobonds, suffered a military coup and adopted the US dollar as its national currency."

Furthermore, a state may intentionally cleanse itself of officials who draw fire from important international actors. For example, current Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa resigned from his post as the Economy Minister in 2005 under national and international scrutiny of his plan to direct a larger percentage of the OCP oil stabilization fund towards social spending, or more precisely, away from the IMF (IFIs Latin American Monitor, 2005). Such a chaotic and fluid political environment undermines institutional maturation and frustrates attempts to establish accountability.

Second, a state in a position of compromised sovereignty, such as that in which Ecuador habitually finds itself, is likely to be incapable of resisting the demands of international actors holding significant material leverage over the state. The targeted state, caught between exclusive demands, must weigh the relative significance of a possible loss of legitimacy against a potentially punitive reaction from the external system. One likely outcome, which is exemplified by the case of the OCP, is that the state declines to challenge its position in the external political order; for continued internal control, it relies on its monopoly of coercive force, engaging its military and police forces to act in support of the supposed national interest (IFIs Latin American Monitor, 2005).

Regardless of case-specific details, it is clear that all campaigns must account for the fact that the

international arena is replete with power inequalities that constrain viable options and promote structural self-replication. The bottom-line implication for TAN effectiveness and predictive theorizing is clear: the combination of competing norms and unequal power structures is certain to challenge and likely to undermine the importance of any form of leverage, whether moral or material, that a network can expect to gain over a target state.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The present discussion has pointed to the existence of a number of underlying conceptual problems. While this exercise was not meant to fully address such concerns, it remains appropriate at this juncture to gather and summarize these issues for the benefit of present clarity and future research.

One central theme is the existence of an international political and economic structure which prioritizes values that are hostile to environmental preservation and non-selective respect for social and cultural diversity. This is not meant as an attack on the capitalist system; indeed, extensive environmental and social damages have been perpetrated by states of all economic and political stripes. The current international system, however, actively promotes the notion that national development *requires* the prioritization of capitalistic policies. Thus, the national interest has been cast in purely economic terms and the state has been encouraged to adopt a corporatist mindset in service of this supposedly unitary purpose. Consequently, the state finds no value in ecological integrity or social harmony that cannot be expressed in dollars and cents; caring for the environment is regarded as restricting activities in support of capital accumulation and reducing profits by internalizing costs.

The state's obligation to earn money has overrun any alternative conceptualization of state responsibility or purpose, such as that of guarantor of the civil and human rights of its citizens or steward of the environment and other common goods. As a result of this orientation, states are amenable to policies that attract industry and foreign investment, even where this occurs at the expense of the citizenry and the national environment. For example, a state might view its unprotected labor force, environmental haven (weak regulations and lax enforcement) policies and weak or nonexistent environmental agencies as comparative advantages that attract industry and thereby justify the social or ecological abuses that are written into such policies (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Most disturbing is a state's willingness to violate its own laws or commit its military or police to the protection of industry; such extreme – yet common – policies effectively constitute a transfer of political power from state to industry.

Furthermore, where the state in question is located within the Third World, its tendency towards dependency on resource-intensive development is reinforced by the economic power structure of the international system. In particular, the unequal relationship between First World and Third World economies favors the former as provider of resources and designer of trade and other economic policies. Bryant and Bailey (1997) characterize this unbalanced relationship as one reminiscent of colonial times, when the "progress" supported by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) "was measured in terms of trees felled, valleys flooded, minerals extracted and acreage dedicated to cash crops or cattle ranching." Noting that IFIs promote structural adjustment programs that "require that states promote economic activities consonant with a given country's 'comparative advantage,'" Bryant and Bailey (1997, pp. 60 & 91) assert that IFI policies result in double damage: first by lending support to development projects that have negative environmental and social consequences and then by demanding that indebted states make payment on project loans "... by cashing in natural resources."

External debt, resource-intensive development, and state dependency on multinational corporations (for foreign direct investment, technical expertise and infrastructure development) together result in self-replicating economic necessity, prioritization of corporate values, and state complicity in the consequences of industrial activity (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Once caught in this cycle, a state that abandons environmentally degrading or socially oppressive development projects risks that international creditors will remove it from the economic life support system (Bryant & Bailey, 1997).

Given that the external structure demands a state to adopt a corporatist orientation, can responsibility be assigned to a state? Is there a chance that advocates can impact state orientation or does the state's articulation within the international system have a deterministic effect that renders a target unwilling, if not incapable, of responding to advocacy? If so, should activists focus their efforts on First World states or IFIs in hopes of a normative trickle-down effect?

First, it is clear that in theory a state can select from among a number of orientations with respect to its citizens and natural environment. The fact that options exist is demonstrated by empirical evidence of a range of state orientations and documented by organizations like Transparency International and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project which conduct comparative research and construct databases.¹ The availability of alternative orientations is also a stable concept in theoretical work; for example, Bryant and Bailey (1997) find that there is a "central paradox in the state's function," meaning that a state can and must choose to

act as either the steward or destroyer of the natural environment.

In general, campaign analysis should flow from an understanding of the relative position of the target within the external power structure. This variable matters enormously for campaign outcome since targeting an economically dependent state does not alter the power imbalances that encourage the state to adopt offensive policies and since, in such circumstances, looking to the international arena for traditional leverage is inherently illogical.

A case study should begin with the widest lens available in order to understand the target's position within its external context; from such an angle, it should be possible to assess the external risk to the target should it choose comply with network demands. If a given risk level does not essentially immobilize the target, then state and sub-state level analysis may follow. If it is determined that the target is severely constrained by the external structure, however, then theorists must consider the possibility that no campaign, no matter its framing choices or density, can impact the orientation of the target unless it also challenges the larger structure. Clearly, the international dimension must factor significantly in transnational activism theory building.

CONCLUSIONS

While it is unreasonable to wholly assign either blame or credit for a campaign outcome to the network itself, Keck and Sikkink's (1997) original formulation should not be abandoned. It is far more valuable to problematize and expand on the authors' original independent variables so that these become more useful indicators of the complexity of the international system and enhance the ability to theoretically account for a wider range of variation on the dependent variable. All instances and outcomes of transnational activism are complicated by network interaction with a larger system that is characterized by uneven distributions of power. Theories of transnational advocacy should direct attention to the possible impacts of this interaction on advocacy campaign outcomes.

¹ For more information about Transparency International, see <http://www.transparency.org/>. Information on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project can be found at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.

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